His activity as curator taught him cautionLong he thinks that a decade is a maximumThe message of Louis Gallois was not relayedNo inspector will refuse to receive a fellowNothing significant was agreed to this dayEvidenced by the eponymous title or Cool breezeThe France is therefore only one standingBut twelve hours later the man feels wellWithout disclosing more before its intentionsAnd that its removal can turn to disasterThe Minister of the Budget recently said to a hardening of the taxation of securities capital gains. It would be to submit them to the contributions from the first euro, while they are currently exempt from any levy - social and tax - when the amount of transfers of securities does not exceed 25.730 euros. If the considered in isolation, could find justification for this measure. In particular, is there little reason to tax very differently realized capital gains and revenues collected as interest or dividends. So, rather than each year for such adjustments to the margin, sometimes higher sometimes lower, it would be far preferable to once and for all a complete remission flat of our system of levies on savings. In fact, it is now exceedingly complex, unreadable and inefficient. As the legislation is itself very unstable: the Board of taxation, not less than 86 measures in 32 acts, focused on security taxes between 1998 and 2006!
This complexity could be justified if derogatory plans meet well defined and consistent goals between them in economic efficiency or fairness. But such is not the case: this juxtaposition of devices is first and foremost the historic accumulation of specific measures rather than an overall logic. The result is that many incentives and added each other interfere between them without actually achieve their goals, while distorting the choice of placement of households in their needs often divergent directions. For example, on the one hand, the State has implemented over time various devices for equity investments. But, on the other, multiple exemptions and tax benefits continue to encourage households to focus on liquid savings or little risky, even that they already have spontaneously tend to do so. Hardening envisaged the taxation of capital gains would add to this inconsistency, since regulated savings books remain on them completely exempt of any social and tax levy.
With this observation, it should simplify and unify the levies on savings. In fact, these include two floors. The first consists of social security payments, relatively wide plate and single rate (12.1): they generate alone over two-thirds of the total revenues collected on movable savings. The second floor, which corresponds to the tax levies, is instead in very narrow base (covering less than one third of the income and capital gains) and with different rates (ranging from 7.5 to 35 for the fixed levy at source): it is this stage which is the main source of complexity and distortions, while budget performance is very modest. We propose therefore, to total revenue unchanged (and while now a share and one share tax), to replace the set by a "flat tax": the single rate would be close to 20 and apply to all savings products, without exception.This sample rate would be significantly lower than that of 30.1 currently supported by the interest and capital gains subjected to the fixed levy at source, and similar to that of 19.6 on the products of life over a period of eight years. Only two exceptions would be made to this "flat tax". On the one hand, a lump sum allowance at the base (reverting to be taxed at zero rate first hundreds of euros in income or capital gains) would exempt households with household income are modest, and establish a certain progressivity of the levy. This reduction would be equivalent, for many taxpayers, the exemption of regulated booklets, but without the disadvantages on tax neutrality. On the other hand, tax incentives would be reserved for only devices of savings in the long term, in return for this savings blocking constraints.
Such a system would be simple, neutral and directly incentive both to long-term savings. Is it completely utopian The answer is no, as shown in some foreign examples. The reform led to the Netherlands in the early 2000s was still more radical, also integrating land revenues and by merging the together with the wealth tax. To ensure the transition and to respect the principle of non-retroactivity tax, a "grandfather" clause should of course be introduced for existing devices. In addition, the current financial context, characterized by low interest rates and of significant losses (latent or realized), could, paradoxically, facilitate the implementation of such a reform, reducing its potential redistributive effects.